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Abstract. Most one-round key exchange protocols provide only weak
forward secrecy at best. Furthermore, one-round protocols with strong
forward secrecy often break badly when faced with an adversary who
can obtain ephemeral keys. We provide a characterisation of how strong
forward secrecy can be achieved in one-round key exchange. Moreover,
we show that protocols exist which provide strong forward secrecy and
remain secure with weak forward secrecy even when the adversary is
allowed to obtain ephemeral keys. We provide a compiler to achieve this
for any existing secure protocol with weak forward secrecy.
1 Introduction
Two-party key agreement continues to be a topic of active research. Although
we understand much better now than we did ten years ago how to design such
protocols and how to model their security, controversy remains as to precisely
what is the right security model and new designs, security proofs and attacks
continue to be published [19, 8, 11]. Moreover, there are continuing trends to find
new useful security properties, model them and provide instantiating protocols.
Forward secrecy. One of the most important security properties for key agree-
ment is forward secrecy. This is the property that compromise of long-term keys
should not result in compromise of session keys agreed before the long-term keys
were compromised. This property was first articulated by Diffie, van Oorschot
and Wiener [14] and has been incorporated into various recent formal security
models [2, 17]. Forward secrecy is often regarded as an optional extra to funda-
mental security properties, particularly confidentiality and implicit authentica-
tion of the session key. However, it is always a desirable property if it can be
provided without too much computational overhead.
Generally speaking, protocols which provide forward secrecy are computa-
tionally more expensive than those which dispense with it. It is also often the
case that forward secrecy requires more communications complexity, in that
more messages are sent between the two parties of the protocol. A typical way
of providing forward secrecy is to ensure that the session key is defined only
in terms of ephemeral secrets while the messages exchanged are authenticated
using long-term secrets. The classic Diffie–Hellman key exchange [13] is a typ-
ical component for the ephemeral exchange, while signatures can be used for
authentication. Since it is necessary to prevent replayed messages, each party
typically provides a random challenge or nonce which is signed together with
the ephemeral Diffie–Hellman value. This means that the complete protocol uses
three messages.
As well as the number of messages, a useful measure of the communications
efficiency is the number of protocol rounds. One protocol round consists of all
messages which can be communicated simultaneously. In recent years it has
become commonplace to present two-party key exchange protocols in one round
versions [16–18, 26, 15]. This means that the two protocol messages can be sent
independently and simultaneously.
Weak forward secrecy. In 2005, Krawczyk presented the, now well-known, proto-
col HMQV [17] as a one-round two-message protocol (there is also a one-message
variant). Krawczyk pointed out that HMQV does not provide forward secrecy in
its full generality. Indeed, he showed an explicit attack in the case that the adver-
sary is allowed to be active in the session which it is attacking. This means that
the adversary can manipulate messages sent to the target victim; later, when the
victim has completed the session and erased the session key, the adversary cor-
rupts the victim and is able to reconstruct the session key. This attack applies to
other protocols too, in particular those in which the messages exchanged are the
same as those in basic Diffie–Hellman exchange. However, the attack does not
apply to the many protocols which use the sender’s long-term key to construct
the message. In Section 2 we will present a variation of Krawczyk’s attack which
applies to a very broad class of one-round protocols.
Krawczyk defined a restricted form of forward secrecy which assumes that the
adversary is not active during the session under attack. This certainly covers a
wide variety of attack scenarios but is not as comprehensive a threat model as we
would like to have. Following Krawczyk [17] we will say that a protocol achieves
weak forward secrecy (wFS) if it provides forward secrecy when the adversary
is not active in the test session. To clearly distinguish it from the ideal security
level, in this paper we say that a protocol achieves strong forward secrecy (sFS) if
forward secrecy is provided even when the adversary is active in the test session.
It seems reasonable to assume that in some scenarios an adversary would be
active against a chosen session with the intention of later attempting to gain
access to long-term keys of its victims so sFS is arguably an important property.
Definition 1 (Strong and weak forward secrecy (informal)). A protocol
provides forward secrecy if the adversary cannot distinguish the agreed session
key from a random string even given the long-term keys of both parties after the
session is complete. There are two types of forward secrecy.
– If this property still holds even if the adversary takes an active part in the
session under attack we say that the protocol provides strong forward se-
crecy. In this case the victim executes the session with the adversary who
masquerades as a legitimate party.
– If this property only holds when the adversary is prevented from taking an
active part in the session under attack we say that the protocol provides weak
forward secrecy. In this case the victim executes the session with a legitimate
party whose messages are transmitted correctly to the victim.
Related work. Krawczyk pointed out that many one-round protocols only achieve
weak forward secrecy. Indeed, he stated that weak forward secrecy is the best
possible for “. . . any 2-message key-exchange protocol . . . with no secure shared
state previously established between the parties” [17, page 15]. This seems to
have led many researchers to believe incorrectly that sFS is always impossible
for one-round key exchange. For example, LaMacchia et al. [18] have stated that
Krawczyk’s argument showed that “no 2-round AKE protocol can achieve full
perfect forward secrecy (PFS)” while Boyd et al. [5] say “Krawczyk showed that
forward secrecy in the usual sense cannot be achieved in a two-pass protocol
such as the ones that we consider.” Chow and Choo [9] stated that “two-party
protocols with only two-message flow and having no previous establishment of
secure shared state cannot achieve perfect forward secrecy”. Saar et al. [23] said
“no two-pass key exchange protocol can achieve forward secrecy”.
Nevertheless, one-round protocols with strong forward secrecy do exist. In
2010 Gennaro et al. [15] have shown that a much older one-round protocol of
Okamoto and Tanaka, with minor modifications, does indeed provide strong
forward secrecy. A protocol of Jeong, Katz and Lee [16] from 2004 is another
example. It is a natural question to ask exactly when sFS can be achieved.
Gennaro et al. point out that sFS is impossible for a one-round protocol when
“information transmitted between the parties is computed without access to the
parties’ long-term secrets”1.
Although it is not often acknowledged, Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [2,
Section 7] seem to have been the first to define a notion of weak forward secrecy
for key exchange. Their definition is strongly related to that given by Krawczyk,
but the model of Bellare et al. [2] has some significant differences from that used
by Krawczyk. Specifically, they do not separate an adversary’s ability to obtain
long-term keys from the ability to obtain session state (including ephemeral
keys). This means that their definition of wFS is different and although they
point out that sFS (in their definition) is not possible for two-message protocols,
their simple attack in such a scenario would not be valid in models popular today
(see Section 2.1 for further discussion on models).
Recently, in independent work, Cremers and Feltz [10] have proposed a new
one-round protocol which provides strong forward secrecy (and also deniability).
For their security proof, rather than forbid all ephemeral keys to be revealed by
the adversary, they define a new model which precisely prevents the adversary
from obtaining useful ephemeral keys. The result is to ensure that the attack
1 Gennaro et al. call this situation implicit authentication but we avoid this terminol-
ogy here because it conflicts with other usages of the same term.
we present in Section 2.2 is not available to the adversary in their model. The
construction of their protocol can be seen as related to the compiler we construct
in this paper, the main difference being that they use signatures where we use
a MAC. The consequence of this is that our construction can be more efficient,
but in compensation the protocol of Cremers and Feltz provides security against
a stronger adversary.
Our results. Our first result in this paper is to show that one-round key ex-
change protocols with sFS are impossible if the adversary is allowed to reveal
the ephemeral secrets of the protocol. Specifically we show that sFS is not pos-
sible when the adversary is allowed to reveal ephemeral secrets of the partner
party to the test session. We achieve this by defining a very general class of two-
party one-round key exchange protocols and presenting a variation of Krawczyk’s
attack which applies to all such protocols. This result gives a clear separation
between models where sFS is achievable and those where it is not.
As implied by our first result, the models used by Gennaro et al. [15] and
by Jeong et al. [16] to prove sFS for their protocols have to disallow ephemeral
key reveal queries to the adversary. In some application scenarios this may be
a reasonable assumption, but suppose that an adversary is later found to be
able to obtain ephemeral secrets after all. Of course sFS is no longer possible,
but what about wFS or other security properties? It turns out that both of
these protocols break very badly in this situation - not only is wFS not obtained
when ephemeral keys can be revealed, but the protocols are no longer secure
in any meaningful sense. Thus these two protocols are sensitive to changes in
the security model and there seems no reason why this should have to occur.
The second main result of this paper is to show that more robust security is
possible. Specifically we demonstrate existence of protocols which provide sFS
when ephemeral key compromise is forbidden to the adversary, but maintain
wFS and basic protocol security if ephemeral keys do become available to the
adversary. As well as strengthening our theoretical understanding of security
models for key exchange, we believe that this result points out a practically
important way to achieve robust security for real-world protocols.
Paper outline. In the next section we review definitions of strong and weak
forward secrecy in modern security models for key exchange. We then explain
why strong forward secrecy cannot be obtained when ephemeral key reveal is
available to the adversary, on the normal assumption that replays cannot be
detected without interaction. Section 3 illustrates that current protocols either
fail to achieve strong forward secrecy, even under a weakened adversary, or fail
to achieve weak forward secrecy under a strong adversary. This leads us to
propose a compiler to convert weakly secure protocols into ones which have
sFS. Applying this compiler we can obtain many protocols which provide strong
forward secrecy under a weakened adversary but which degrade gracefully to
provide weak forward secrecy when faced with a strong adversary. Finally we
propose some avenues for further research.
2 Strong forward secrecy in one round
In this section we will describe in what circumstances forward secrecy can be
achieved in terms of the security model in use. We first need to establish how
forward secrecy is captured in currently used computational models.
2.1 Defining forward secrecy
Cryptographic models for key exchange were initiated by Bellare and Rogaway
in the 1990s [3, 4]. These initial papers did not include a definition of forward
secrecy, but later Pointcheval joined the authors to extend their model to deal
with various properties [2] including forward secrecy. In recent years an alter-
native model by Canetti and Krawczyk [1, 6] has become more popular; we will
use an extended version of this model due to Krawczyk [17] later in this paper
and we will refer to this as the CK model.
The CK model uses the same basic idea as the Bellare and Rogaway model.
The adversary is an efficient (PPT) algorithm which controls communications
between the set of protocol participants. A session is an instance of a protocol at
a specific party; each session has an associated session state which is distinct from
the long-term keys of the party which owns the session. The adversary activates
sessions and sends messages to sessions which respond according to the protocol
specification. At some point a session can complete and accept a session key.
The session identifier of a completed session s is (A,B,Out, In) where A is the
owner of the session, B is the intended peer party, and Out, In are the messages
sent and received by the session. A different completed session s′ is said to be
a matching session of s if its session identifier is (B,A, In,Out). Note that a
matching session may not exist even when s completes; indeed this corresponds
exactly to the situation when the adversary is active in s.
The adversary is allowed access to various oracles which correspond to plau-
sible capabilities of real-life adversaries, as follows.
session key reveal This query takes as input a session identifier and returns the
session key if the session is complete.
session state reveal This query takes as input a session identifier. If the session is
incomplete then the session state is returned. This can typically be ephemeral
keys.
corruption This query takes as input a party identifier and returns all the keys
of the party. This includes long-term keys, session state and session key (if
available).
expiry This query takes as input a session identifier and deletes the session key
(and any related session state). While it has no output, expiry is of major
importance in defining strong forward secrecy.
At some point during its run the adversary has to nominate a completed
test session. The adversary’s goal is then to distinguish the session key from a
random string. In response to the test query the adversary is given one of two
strings each with probability 1/2; one string is the session key from the test
session and the other is a key drawn uniformly at random from the session key
space. The adversary may then continue with other queries before outputting
a bit b identifying whether or not the string is the session key. The adversary’s
advantage is the probability that it chooses the correct value of b minus 1/2.
The adversary is not allowed to make queries which would trivially allow it
to obtain the session key. Specifically, no session key reveal is allowed against
the test session or its matching session (if it exists). In addition, no corruption
is allowed at the test session or its matching session (if it exists) before the
session is expired. However, in order to model strong forward secrecy we allow
the adversary to corrupt the owner of the test session and the peer party after
the session has expired. We also disallow session state reveal on the test session
and its matching session (if it exists). Note, however, that when the adversary
is active in the test session it chooses the messages received by the session and
can choose its own ephemeral values.
Definition 2 ([17]). A key-exchange protocol is called CK-secure if for all ad-
versaries A:
1. if two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions in a run of the pro-
tocol then, except for a negligible probability, the session key output in these
sessions is the same;
2. A succeeds (in its test-session distinguishing attack) with probability not more
that 1/2 plus a negligible fraction.
Notice that protocols which satisfy this formal definition of security automat-
ically have strong forward secrecy. This is because the adversary is allowed to
expire the test session and subsequently corrupt the parties to the test session.
Furthermore, there is no restriction on the adversary to be active during the test
session. Canetti and Krawczyk [6] extended their definition to protocols without
any forward secrecy by removing the expire query from the adversary’s list of
available oracles. Later, Krawczyk [17] formally defined weak forward secrecy by
disallowing the adversary from constructing its own messages during the test
session — messages must simply be relayed between uncorrupted parties for the
test session.
Cremers [11] has pointed out that matching in the CK model is not defined
for sessions which are not complete which means that we cannot always be sure
whether the adversary is allowed state reveal queries against incomplete sessions.
This will not cause us a problem in the subsequent proof since we will show that
state reveal can never be allowed when strong forward secrecy is required.
In 2007, LaMacchia et al. [18] introduced a new model known as eCK in-
tended for analysis of two-party key agreement protocols based on Diffie–Hellman.
We will not define the eCK model in detail here. Instead we point out some of
its main features relevant to forward secrecy. A comparison of the differences
between the eCK and CK models has been made by other authors [11, 25].
A main aim of the eCK model is to capture a wider range of attacks than
the CK model by allowing exposure of ephemeral keys and long-term keys of
the test session and its peer. Instead of considering session state, the eCK model
assumes that there will be an ephemeral key generated by each party and the
model defines an ephemeral key reveal query. Since the session key can be trivially
computed given ephemeral and long-term keys of one party to the test session,
exposure of both ephemeral and long-term keys from the same session is for-
bidden. However other exposures are allowed, in particular the adversary can
obtain the ephemeral key of the test session and the long-term key of the peer
party. This is not possible in the CK model since session-state reveal is explicitly
forbidden for the test session and so this has led to the notion that the eCK
model is more powerful than the CK model. However this is not the case as was
later observed by several authors [5, 25, 11]. Cremers [11] has conducted a careful
comparison of the CK model (in the original and modified versions) and the eCK
model and shown clearly that they cannot be ordered according to strength.
Note that it is impossible to fully describe strong forward secrecy in the eCK
model because there is no notion of session expiry in the eCK model. Indeed
the model forbids exposure of the long-term key of the peer in the case that no
matching session of the test session exists (which is the same as saying that the
adversary is active in the test session). However, protocols proven secure in the
eCK model provide weak forward secrecy since the session key remains secure
even if both long-term keys involved in the session are exposed.
2.2 Strong forward secrecy and ephemeral key reveal
We first present a generic definition of one-round two-party key exchange to
allow us to describe an abstract result. We assume that any user A holds a
long-term secret xA which is used for all protocol instances and generates a new
short-term ephemeral secret rA for each protocol instance. There is also public
information associated with the protocol. Common protocols based on Diffie–
Hellman key exchange expect users to hold public keys of the form yA = g
xA
in some suitable group generated by g, but we do not assume this structure.
Public information will typically include user public keys, user identities, and
other system parameters such as the algebraic setting and master public keys.
In a one-round protocol, users can only send a single message and this mes-
sage must be independent of the message sent by the other party. In general the
message sent by A is generated by some function f , randomised by some random
input rA from some set R and f may have other inputs including xA and any
public information. We denote the output of f(·) by tA. Note that tA may have
some arbitrary structure (particular some distinct components) in general. On
receiving the message tB from its peer, user A can then compute the shared
secret ZAB using some other function which we denote F (·). The inputs to F
are tB and any of the same inputs used for f . Note, however, that F must be
deterministic if A and B are to compute the same value ZAB . The peer of A will
compute ZAB in a symmetrical way but it is not necessary that the computation
is identical. One example is that the computation may depend on the ordering
of the peer identities in some natural ordering. Therefore we describe functions
fˆ and Fˆ used by B, analogous to f and F used by A – for most published
protocols f = fˆ and F = Fˆ . Protocol 1 illustrates the generic protocol messages
and shared secret computation.
A B
rA ← R
tA = f(xA, rA, public info)
tA−−−−−−−→ rB ← R
tB = fˆ(xB , rB ,public info)
ZAB = F (xA, rA, tB ,public info)
tB←−−−−−−− ZAB = Fˆ (xB , rB , tA, public info)
Protocol 1: Generic one-round key agreement protocol
To our knowledge all prominent two-party key exchange protocols satisfy our
generic description. In many protocols, such as HMQV [17], the messages tA and
tB are simply Diffie–Hellman messages: tA = g
rA and tB = g
rB where g generates
a suitable group. Other protocols, such as Naxos [18], include the long-term key
of the sender in the computation of tA. All the protocols we consider rely on
some variant of the Diffie–Hellman problem: finding gxy given gx and gy. Of
particular relevance in this paper is the gap Diffie–Hellman (GDH) assumption
[22] which says that solving the (computational) Diffie–Hellman problem is hard
even given access to a decisional oracle for the Diffie–Hellman problem.
We are now in a position to describe how the adversary A can break the
forward secrecy of the generic protocol given access to ephemeral keys. In this
analysis we need to explicitly assume that the parties are not able to detect replay
of a valid message from the peer party. This is not an unusual assumption since
both messages have to be independent of fresh input from the peer party in any
one-round protocol. Indeed, this assumption holds for all prominent one-round
protocols [17, 18, 26]. Protocols using timestamps or counters to detect replays
would not be vulnerable to this attack, but most modern protocols prefer to avoid
relying on these mechanisms. The attack of adversary A proceeds as follows.
1. A observes a protocol instance between A and B and records the first mes-
sage tA from A. A asks for the ephemeral value rA used in this instance.
2. A initiates a new instance of the protocol with B. In this instance A mas-
querades as A. A sends tA from the earlier protocol instance as the first
message of the new instance. B will compute a new rB and tB and send tB
to A which is captured by A.
3. A eventually expires the session and corrupts A to obtain xA. A now has all
the inputs of F so can re-compute ZAB .
The impact of this attack is that the adversary can recover any information sent
by B during the session established in step 2.
Proposition 1. A one-round key exchange protocol cannot provide strong for-
ward secrecy in any model which allows the adversary to reveal ephemeral secrets
of the partner party to the test session. This holds even if ephemeral secrets can-
not be revealed during the test session.
The attack process described above is a variant of the attack which Krawczyk
uses to illustrate that HMQV cannot achieve strong forward secrecy. The main
difference is that Krawczyk does not include step 1 of our attack. Since HMQV
has messages which are independent of the long-term secret xA, the active ad-
versary can start the attack at step 2 and generate a valid message with a new
random rA value. In order to avoid Krawczyk’s attack, any one-round protocol
with strong forward secrecy must have messages which depend on the long-term
private key of the sender. However, this alone is not sufficient. For example, the
Naxos protocol which we examine below includes long-term private keys of the
sender in the messages but does not provide strong forward secrecy.
3 Reconciling strong and weak forward secrecy
Having clarified when sFS cannot be achieved, in this section we turn to con-
sideration of when sFS can be achieved. We first take a look at protocols with
a proof of sFS and note that they all seem to have severe drawbacks against
powerful adversaries2. We also look at some well-known protocols secure against
strong adversaries and note that these do not provide sFS even when ephemeral
keys cannot be revealed. This leads us to look for protocols with a more graceful
degradation of security.
3.1 Current protocols with sFS
Most recent one-round key exchange protocols provide only wFS. Two exceptions
are the mOT protocol of Gennaro et al. [15] and protocols TS2/TS3 of Jeong,
Katz and Lee [16]. As we know must be the case from the results in Section 2, the
models used by Gennaro et al. and Jeong et al. for their security proofs do not
allow ephemeral keys to be revealed. The mOT protocol refines an early identity-
based protocol of Okamoto and Tanaka [20, 21] but can be easily converted to
a traditional public-key version. If an adversary is allowed to reveal ephemeral
keys the mOT protocol is completely insecure – the adversary can immediately
obtain the sender’s long-term private key as a consequence.
Protocol TS3 of Jeong et al. is shown as Protocol 2. This protocol, which we
will refer to as the JKL protocol, is essentially basic Diffie–Hellman authenticated
by a message authentication code (MAC) whose key is the static Diffie–Hellman
between A and B. The properties of Protocol 2 are similar to signed Diffie–
Hellman but use of the MAC gives better efficiency. (We note that a one-round
version of signed Diffie–Hellman was proven secure by Shoup [24] in a model
with static corruption.)
2 An exception is the recent protocol of Cremers and Feltz [10] mentioned in the
introduction.
Shared information: Static key, SAB = g
xA,xB .
A B
rA ← R
tA = g
rA
tA,MACSAB (A,B, tA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ← R
tB = g
rB
ZAB = t
rA
B
tB ,MACSAB (B,A, tB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ZAB = trBA
Protocol 2: Jeong–Katz–Lee (JKL) protocol TS3
Consider an adversary A against Protocol 2 who can obtain ephemeral keys.
We already know that sFS cannot be achieved, but unfortunately things are
worse than that. Once A has obtained the value rA for a protocol run of A
with B, A can replay the first message of the protocol against B as many times
as he likes and always obtain the session key. Therefore this protocol, just like
mOT, does not even provide a basic level of security once ephemeral keys may
be revealed.
3.2 Remaining secure with a more powerful adversary
Security proofs for key exchange are usually only provided in a single model. This
is fine when we understand the security context in which the protocol is to be
deployed. In practice it is quite likely that a protocol, particularly a standardised
one, will be deployed in a variety of contexts. Moreover, the security context
may change after the protocol is deployed. It therefore seems a very desirable
property that a protocol should degrade its security level gracefully when faced
with a stronger adversary than originally envisaged. From this viewpoint the
mOT and JKL protocols both behave very badly. We would therefore like to
find whether there is a protocol which provides sFS when ephemeral key reveal
is forbidden yet still provides wFS when ephemeral key reveal becomes available
to the adversary.
Since current protocols with sFS do not provide what we are looking for, it is
natural to try starting from a protocol which is already known to provide wFS
against a strong adversary and see if it can achieve sFS when ephemeral key
reveal is forbidden. One obvious candidate protocol is the Naxos protocol [18]
shown as Protocol 3. Parties A and B hold long-term secret keys xA and xB
respectively, with corresponding public keys yA = g
xA and yB = g
xB . LaMacchia
et al. [18] gave a proof of the Naxos protocol on the assumption that the gap
Diffie–Hellman problem is hard. Hash functions H1 and H2 are modelled as
random oracles in the proof.
Unfortunately it turns out that Naxos does not provide sFS even when
ephemeral key reveal is forbidden (to prevent the generic attack in Section 2.2).
A B
rA ← R
hA = H1(xA, rA)
tA = g
hA tA−−−−−−−→ rB ← R
hB = H1(xB , rB)
tB = g
hB
ZAB = H2(t
xA
B , y
hA
B , t
hA
B , A,B)
tB←−−−−−−− ZAB = H2(yhBA , txBA , thBA , A,B)
Protocol 3: Naxos protocol
Given the long-term key of B, an active adversary A can obtain the session key
from an expired session as follows.
1. A chooses a random ephemeral private key r′B and sends t′B = gr
′
B to party
A.
2. A will compute the shared secret as ZAB = H2(t
′
B
xA , yhAB , t
′
B
hA , A,B).
3. After session expiry A can also compute ZAB = H2(yr
′
B
A , t
xB
A , t
r′B
A , A,B).
This allows A easily to compute the session key once the long-term private
key of B, xB , is revealed. It turns out that a similar ‘attack’ is possible on CMQV
[26] too. We therefore need to look for a new example of a protocol which provides
graceful security degradation. In the next section we will provide a generic way
to provide many such examples by designing a compiler which takes any protocol
secure in the eCK or CK models and converts it into a protocol with sFS.
Table 1 summarises what we have found with regard to existing prominent
protocols and also lists our new variant of the Naxos protocol shown as Protocol 5
in Section 4. Security analysis of Protocol 5 will be presented in Section 4. For
each protocol we show the security status in the two cases where (i) the adversary
is allowed to obtain the ephemeral keys (for the eCK model) or session state
information (for the CK model) and (ii) when this is not allowed. Recall that we
cannot obtain sFS in the normal eCK model but it potentially could be achieved
if ephemeral key reveal is disallowed and long-term keys for the test session are
kept private until after session expiry. However, we know that HMQV, Naxos
and CMQV do not achieve sFS even under these conditions or in the CK model
without state reveal queries.
4 A compiler for protocols with graceful security
degradation
In this section we present a compiler, denoted C, based on the JKL protocol
which transforms a protocol secure in either the CK or eCK model into one
which provides sFS in a model without ephemeral key reveal. The idea is to add
the authentication method used in the JKL protocol using an independent key.
Thus any party A now has two independent public keys, yA with corresponding
private key xA, and y
′
A = g
x′A . The original protocol will be authenticated using
a MAC keyed with the static key SAB = g
x′Ax
′
B .
As in the JKL protocol [16] we require that the MAC is strongly unforge-
able under chosen message attack in the standard definition. Furthermore, the
assumption that the MAC key is a group element can be adapted to suit real-
world MACs by applying a randomness extractor as also discussed by Jeong et
al. [16].
Protocol 4 shows the result of applying the compiler C to the generic Proto-
col 1 from Section 2.2. The additional cost of the compiled protocol is just one
exponentiation, one MAC generation and one MAC verification per party.
Private keys of A : xA, x
′
A
Private keys of B : xB , x
′
B
Shared information: Generator g of group G. Static key, SAB = g
x′Ax
′
B .
A B
rA ← R
tA = f(xA, rA, public info)
tA,MACSAB (A,B, tA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ← R
tB = fˆ(xB , rB , public info)
tB ,MACSAB (B,A, tB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
ZAB = F (xA, rA, tB , public info) ZAB = Fˆ (xB , rB , tA, public info)
Protocol 4: Image of Protocol 1 under compiler C
In order to make a formal security claim we need to adapt the CK security
model. By definition of forward secrecy we must allow the adversary to obtain
the long-term keys of the parties in the test session. In addition we must allow
the adversary to be active in the test session so it is essential to prevent the
adversary from obtaining the long-term keys until after the test session is com-
plete. Therefore we should allow the adversary access to the Expiry query and
then allow corruption of the test session after it is expired, which will reveal only
Table 1. Comparison of protocol security with and without ephemeral key/state reveal
Ephemeral key/state reveal?
Protocol Yes No
HMQV [17] wFS (CK) wFS
mOT [15], JKL [16] Insecure sFS
Naxos [18], CMQV [26] wFS (eCK) wFS
Protocol 5 wFS (eCK) sFS
the long-term keys. Furthermore, in order to thwart the attack of Section 2.2,
we must disallow session state reveal queries to the partner party to the test
session (in addition to disallowing session state reveal to the test session itself).
Therefore the model we use can be defined to be the CK model, as defined in
Section 2.1, without these session state reveal queries; we will refer to this model
as the CK-NSR model.
Theorem 1. Suppose pi is a protocol which is secure in either the eCK model or
in the CK model with wFS. Then C(pi) is secure in the CK-NSR model with sFS,
assuming that the DDH problem in G is hard and the MAC is a secure message
authentication code. Moreover, C(pi) remains secure with wFS in the CK/eCK
model (whichever model pi is secure in).
Proof. We first claim that since the original protocol pi already has a security
proof in either the CK or the eCK model it is straightforward to see that the secu-
rity proof will still hold for C(pi) since the private keys used for the MAC scheme
are generated independently of the long-term keys used for the computations
of the original protocol pi. A trivial reduction will allow a successful adversary
against protocol C(pi) to be converted into a successful adversary against pi.
Now we turn to the more interesting case of showing that C(pi) provides sFS.
We consider a sequence of security games: Game0 to Game3. Denote by Si the
event that an adversary A against Gamei succeeds.
Game0: This is the original sFS game between an adversary A in the CK-
NSR model and protocol C(pi). The advantage of an adversary against Game0 is
defined as
AdvC(pi) =
∣∣∣∣Pr(S0)− 12
∣∣∣∣ . (1)
Game1: This game is the same as Game0 except that the game aborts if A
sends a valid message to any session which was not previously output by another
uncorrupted session.
Let A be an adversary against C(pi) and let forgery be the event that the A
forges a valid message. Then,
|Pr(S1)− Pr(S0)| ≤ Pr(forgery). (2)
In order to bound the probability of a forgery, we construct an adversary F
against the MAC scheme. F simulates the environment for the adversary A in
Game1 and will attempt to forge a MAC in the event that forgery occurs.
The input to F consists of the parameters of the MAC scheme, which includes
access to a MAC oracle. Suppose that nu is a bound on the number of users of
the protocol. For all users F generates a key pair for the MAC keys (the x′I ). F
generates the other long-term private keys (the xI) for all users. F picks a pair
of identities A,B at random from the set of all users of the protocol.
F then starts adversary A. Note that F knows all the private keys and there-
fore it can perfectly simulate the interface expected by A for all parties. However,
we modify the simulation as follows: for sessions between A and B, instead of
using the long term MAC secret gx
′
Ax
′
B , F will make use of the MAC oracle
that it has access to in the MAC security game that F is simultaneously play-
ing. Further, in the case that A corrupts A or B, F aborts the protocol. Recall
that we have defined the key to the MAC to be an element of the group gener-
ated by g. Then, from the DDH assumption, one can see that this simulation is
indistinguishable from perfect.
Eventually the event forgery occurs which includes a valid MAC of a protocol
user. With probability at least 1/n2u this is a MAC of user A in a session with B.
When this occurs neither A nor B can have been corrupted so the protocol has
not been aborted. Denote by successF the probability that F succeeds in breaking
the unforgeability of the MAC scheme. Then we have shown the following, where
AdvDDH is the advantage of an efficient adversary against the DDH problem and
AdvMAC is the advantage of an efficient adversary in breaking the MAC scheme.
Pr(forgery) ≤ n2u(AdvDDH + AdvMAC ). (3)
Game2: This game is the same as Game1 except for the following. Two users
A and B are chosen at random amongst all users. If A chooses any other two
parties for the test session, or does not choose the test session to belong to user
A, then the game aborts.
A and B represent a guess at the parties in the test session selected by A,
specifically that the test session belongs to user A with peer party B. This is a
game transition based on a large failure event in the sense of Dent [12]. Since
the probability that the guess of both parties is correct is bounded by 1/n2u we
have:
Pr(S2) =
1
n2u
(
Pr(S1)− 1
2
)
+
1
2
. (4)
Game3: This game is the same as Game2 except for the following. A value n
∗ is
chosen at random with 1 ≤ n∗ ≤ ns where ns is the maximum number of session
which A is allowed to schedule between any two parties. We denote the n∗-th
session between A and B by s∗. The session s∗ represents a guess at the test
session which will be selected by A. This is also a transition based on a large
failure event so that:
Pr(S3) =
1
ns
(
Pr(S2)− 1
2
)
+
1
2
. (5)
In order to bound the probability of success of adversary A against Game3,
we now construct an adversary B against protocol pi that makes use of A in
the event that it does not abort. We show that in this case B can win its game
whenever A wins. If Advpi is the advantage of an efficient adversary against pi
we thus obtain:
Pr(S3) ≤ 1
2
+ Advpi. (6)
Lemma 1. There is an efficient adversary B against protocol pi which wins ex-
actly when A wins Game3 against C(pi).
Proof (of Lemma 1). We construct an explicit adversary B. The input to B
consists of the public keys and parameters for pi. B interacts with protocol pi using
queries as per the underlying security model (CK or eCK) being considered. The
task of B is to distinguish the session key in its test session from a random key.
Although the adversary A is allowed to be active in the test session, the effect
of including the MAC is that only messages formed by the simulator B will be
valid as determined by Game1. This makes A a passive adversary in all sessions
except those where it replays messages formed by B in earlier sessions. B chooses
independent random key pairs (x′I , g
x′I ) for each party I and sends the public
key components together with the parameters and keys it received to A.
B now simulates all the required oracles for A, making a one to one corre-
spondence with every session run by A, except for sessions between A and B.
That is, all queries that A makes to a party in a session that does not involve
both A and B are simulated by simply relaying the same query to the corre-
sponding oracles available to B in the C(pi) game that B is playing. The reason
why the simulation for sessions between A and B needs to be different is that
in the test session of the pi game B must be passive, whereas in the C(pi) game
A can inject old messages from B to A.
In Game3 we know that A chooses the specific session s∗ as its test session.
A is free to choose either a fresh message or replay an old message which will be
sent to party A, but B needs to ensure that it uses a fresh message. Therefore
before session s∗ occurs, whenever A asks for a fresh message to be sent from B
to A, B asks its challenger for a fresh message m and returns this to A. If A asks
for the response to this message m from A then B also asks for the response r1
from its challenger but stores r1 and then replays the message m and obtains
a new response r2, which it forwards to A. In this way B is free to choose the
session with m and r1 as its test session at A in the case that A replays message
m in session s∗.
For the session s∗, B waits to see whether A invokes a fresh message from
B to A or replays an old message. If it is a fresh message then B can invoke a
fresh message from its challenger and choose this session as its own test session.
If it is a replay then B sends the response that it stored the first time that the
message was invoked from its challenger and chooses that session as its own test
session. Either way the test session for both A and B has the same messages.
B can therefore forward its challenge key K to A and send A’s response at its
own response. Note also the B can continue to simulate sessions after session s∗
using the oracles from its own challenger. Thus B wins exactly if A wins. uunionsq
Combining (1)-(6), we get
AdvC(pi) ≤ n2uns (AdvDDH + AdvMAC + Advpi) . (7)
Since AdvDDH , AdvMAC and Advpi are all negligible by assumption, then so is
AdvC(pi). It is easy to see that all the reductions described above run in polyno-
mial time, which completes the proof of security of C(pi). uunionsq
Protocol 5 shows the result of applying the compiler C to the Naxos protocol
(Protocol 3). In contrast to the protocols discussed in Section 3.1, this protocol
provides sFS but remains secure, even with wFS, when ephemeral key reveal
is allowed. Indeed Protocol 5 is still secure in the eCK model. More efficient
protocols with these properties are certainly possible since we can apply C to
more efficient existing protocols such as CMQV [26].
Private keys of A : xA, x
′
A
Private keys of B : xB , x
′
B
Shared information: Generator g of group G. Static key, SAB = g
x′Ax
′
B .
A B
rA ← R
hA = H1(xA, rA)
tA = g
hA
tA,MACSAB (A,B, tA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rB ← R
hB = H1(xB , rB)
tB = g
hB
ZAB = H2(t
xA
B , y
hA
B , t
hA
B , A,B)
tB ,MACSAB (B,A, tB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ZAB = H2(yhBA , txBA , thBA , A,B)
Protocol 5: Application of compiler C to Naxos protocol
5 Discussion
We have clarified the situations when strong forward secrecy can and cannot
occur for one-round key exchange protocols. Specifically we have shown that
sFS can never be achieved (with normal assumptions) if the adversary is allowed
to reveal ephemeral secrets. We have also shown a generic method of achieving
sFS at the cost of adding roughly one exponentiation per user to the cost of an
existing secure protocol. This allowed us to construct protocols which provides
sFS when ephemeral keys cannot be revealed and still maintain security with
wFS when ephemeral keys can be revealed.
There are some obvious open questions that arise from this work.
– The idea of graceful security degradation can be explored for other properties
such as key compromise impersonation. Generally, considering what happens
to protocols under different security models seems to be unexplored territory.
– It is not obvious that the cost of one exponentiation is the minimum required
to promote secure protocols to ones with sFS. Are there more efficient proto-
cols which can provide graceful degradation from sFS to wFS when a stronger
adversary is encountered?
– It could be interesting to consider whether the picture is any different in the
universal composability model. In this paper we have concentrated on the
popular computational models. Some equivalence results do exist [7]. In our
view it is important to get the situation clear in the well-used models first.
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